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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae respectfully submit this brief in
support of Petitioner, Edward Lane, encouraging the
reversal of the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit,
because the judgment below is inconsistent with
both the Court’s general historical approach to public
employee speech and the specific approach to such
speech that the Court adopted in Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Amici are law professors2 who teach and write
about the constitutional rights of public employees
and have published a number of scholarly articles on
these topics.3 Amici have no financial stake in the
outcome of this case, and in this brief do not ask the
Court to reconsider Garcetti. But we are troubled by
the tendency in some courts of appeals to misread
this Court’s decision in Garcetti to articulate ever1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for amici
represent that they authored this brief in its entirety and that
none of the parties or their counsel, nor any other person
or entity other than amici or their counsel, made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of
this brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.3(a), counsel for amici represent
that all parties have consented to the filing of this brief by filing
letters granting blanket consent to the filing of amicus briefs.
2 A full list of the Amici appear in the Appendix to this brief.
The names of educational institutions are provided for identification purposes only.
3 A representative sample of Amici writings related to the
issues before the Court include: Paul M. Secunda, Whither the
Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV.
1101 (2008); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech,
Categorical Balancing, and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2007); and Scott R. Bauries
& Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the Lines: Garcetti v.
Ceballos in the Federal Appellate Courts, 262 EDUC. L. REP. 357
(2011).

2
broadening readings of the narrow exemption from
First Amendment protection the Court carved out.
We file this brief to urge this Court to correct these
rulings by clarifying the narrow nature of the exemption it recognized.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), excluded
from the First Amendment’s protections a very
narrow category of public employee speech--speech
required of the employee as a contractual employment duty. In this case, however, the Eleventh Circuit misread this very narrow exclusion to remove
from the First Amendment’s protections all public
employee speech that derives in any way from
the employee’s work. Pet. App. 5a-7a. Amici urge
the Court to reverse this erroneous construction of
Garcetti and make clear that the First Amendment
exemption recognized in Garcetti is an exceedingly
narrow one.
Testimonial speech is quintessential "citizen
speech" within the meaning of Garcetti. The duty of
every citizen to respond to a subpoena with truthful
testimony is unquestioned. In fact, as this Court has
repeatedly recognized, it is the bedrock of our judicial
system. Thus, it is beyond cavil that Petitioner’s
testimonial speech was speech as a citizen, rather
than as an employee, and was therefore protected.
Further, the protection of public employees’ testimonial speech preserves their role at the vanguard
of the citizenry. Public employees have a uniquely
valuable understanding of our public institutions,
and they properly serve as the "eyes and ears" of the
public in evaluating the performance of government
institutions. Protecting public employees’ testimonial
speech from retaliation is therefore an essential
condition for public accountability.

3
For all of these reasons, elaborated below, Amici
urge the Court to reverse the Eleventh Circuit.
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THE
NARROW SCOPE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT EXEMPTION IT CARVED OUT IN
GARCETTI
This Court, beginning with Pickering v. Board of
Education of Township High School District 205, 391
U.S. 563 (1968), has long recognized that a public
employee’s speech is protected as long as it addresses
a matter of public concern, and as long as the
employee’s interests as a speaker and the public’s
interests as listeners are not outweighed by the
government’s interests in maintaining an effective
and efficient workplace. See id. at 568; Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1983); Givhan v.
Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414
(1979); Mr. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
The Court’s most recent decision in this line of
precedent, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006),
articulated a categorical exemption from these wellestablished First Amendment protections for public
employees. Under Garcetti, "when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties,
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does
not insulate their communications from employer
discipline." Id. at 421. Thus, public employee speech
made "pursuant to ... official duties" categorically
does not qualify for First Amendment protection,
regardless of any showing of public interest that an
employee might make.
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Garcetti thus recognized a narrow exception to this
Court’s longstanding rule that public employee
speech merits robust First Amendment protection.
Under Garcetti, a public employer may condition
employment on the employee’s relinquishment of the
right to speak as the employee pleases when speaking is part of the employee’s job duties, and the
employee is engaging in that job-required speech; in
other words, when the speech in question is the
employee’s work product. Id. at 421-22. Rather than
requiring a balancing of interests, when an employee
is hired by the government to engage in speech, the
government’s interest in controlling the content and
viewpoint of that speech categorically outweighs
any independent interest the employee may have in
making the speech, or that the public might have in
hearing it.4
Under a proper understanding of the PickeringGarcetti line of precedent, Petitioner’s testimonial
speech was clearly subject to First Amendment protection. First, as Petitioner explains, his testimony
under oath in response to a subpoena in a criminal
trial is and long has been protected speech under the
First Amendment. Pet. Br. 13-25. When a witness
testifies under a subpoena, it is true that the
witness’s discretion to make expressive choices is
necessarily cabined to an extent. The witness may
not choose not to answer (other than to claim the
protections of the Fifth Amendment against selfincrimination or to avoid waiving another privilege),
lest he be held in contempt of court. The witness also
may not choose to lie, for, if he so chooses, he may be
4 See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing, and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos,
42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2007).

subject to a criminal charge for perjury. Importantly,
though, neither of these restrictions derives from the
First Amendment. Rather, the First Amendment
tolerates these restrictions on the otherwise "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’’5 right to speak---or not
to speak--as one pleases because of the vital government interest in fair trials.~ Nevertheless, any witness, even one compelled to testify by subpoena, has
the inherent discretion to make numerous expressive
choices in crafting his testimony. Even a speaker
sitting in the witness chair at trial does not give up
his expressive interests in choosing the words, facial
expressions, and body language through which he
will deliver his responsive and truthful testimony.
Bolstering these expressive interests that lie with
the witness are the interests of the public in hearing
evidence concerning those accused of wrongdoing.
The Court has long held that free speech protections
exist for the benefit of both speakers and listeners in
the public debate. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("It is now well established that
the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."). Accordingly, removing testimonial speech from the First Amendment’s scope--and
therefore chilling witnesses from testifying--would
inherently "’contract the spectrum of available
knowledge’" on which the public can base its opinions.
5 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964) ("Thus we consider this case against the background of
a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.").
6 el. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (declining to
recognize a "reporter’s privilege" not to testify regarding the
identity of a source due to this vital interest).
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Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965)).
Here, the public’s First Amendment interest in
hearing what Petitioner witnessed was especially
strong. Indeed, this case involved allegations of
criminal fraud against a sitting Alabama state legislator; allowing the public to hear Petitioner’s testimony, including the way in which he truthfully
described the facts he witnessed, is of paramount
consideration. The public’s political decision-making
depends on its ability to receive such information,
and the First Amendment protects Petitioner’s
speech in part to serve this public interest. Thus,
it is beyond cavil, and was when Respondent made
the decision to terminate Petitioner, that Petitioner’s
responsive and truthful testimonial speech was
protected speech.
The Eleventh Circuit reached the wrong result in
this case when it held that Petitioner’s testimony
"owe[d] its existence to [his] professional responsibilities" because Petitioner’s testimony "touched only on
acts he performed as part of his official duties," and
was therefore speech made "pursuant to his official
duties" within the meaning of Garcetti. Pet. App. 4a,
5a, 7a (internal quotations omitted). In framing the
inquiry in this way, the Eleventh Circuit misread the
narrow exemption from First Amendment protection
that the Court carved out.7 Though the Garcetti
exemption does not rely on the high-value/low-value
7 See Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the
Lines: Garcetti v. Ceballos in the Federal Appellate Courts, 262
EDUC. L. REP. 357 (2011) (describing the proper scope of the
Garcetti rule).

distinction familiar to other categorical exemptions
from the First Amendment’s protections,s it is operationally similar to these other exemptions, in that it
removes a category of speech from the First Amendment’s protection and does not allow for any showing
of interests to restore this protection. When this
Court exempts a category of speech from otherwise
applicable First Amendment protections, the lower
courts have an important responsibility faithfully to
apply the exemption, a duty that includes reading
the exemption narrowly.9 Indeed, the very definition
of exempt categories of speech under the First Amendment presupposes the categories’ narrowness.10
The Garcetti Court’s repeated use of the phrase
"pursuant to official duties" and its variants can be
read in light of the facts before the Court, and this
reading provides the only context necessary fully to
understand the exemption’s narrow scope. The facts
the Court considered established that (1) a legal
memorandum that Mr. Ceballos, a calendar deputy
employed by the Los Angeles District Attorney’s
Office, drafted recommending dismissal of a pending
8 See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of
Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1 (identifying the then-existing
exemptions and terming the process of categorical exclusion the
"two-level theory").
9 See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, United States v. Stevens: Restricting Two Major Rationales for Content-Based Speech Restrictions,
2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67 (arguing that the rationales supporting the exemption for child pornography should be limited
to the special case of that form of speech and its inherently
criminal character).
10 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942) ("There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.").
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criminal case was the only speech at issue in
the case, Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415 ("[Mr. Ceballos]
alleged petitioners violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments by retaliating against him based on his
memo of March 2."); and (2) Mr. Ceballos drafted the
memorandum pursuant to a specific job duty to draft
legal memoranda, id. at 421 ("Ceballos does not
dispute that he prepared the memorandum ’pursuant
to his duties as a prosecutor’") (quoting Br. for Resp.
at 4, Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra, No. 04-473 (U.S.
filed July 22, 2005), 2005 WL 1801035).
Following a recitation of these facts, the Court
clearly stated its holding: "We hold that when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens
for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline." Id.
The Court stated that the locus or recipient of
the speech is not a controlling or dispositive factor in
the determination of whether the speech is protected.
Id. at 420-21. For this proposition, the Court cited
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District.
In Givhan, a public school employee complained
internally to her supervisors about alleged race
discrimination in personnel decision-making in her
school. 439 U.S. at 412-13. Ms. Givhan made her
statements about her own workplace, to her supervisors, and while she was in the course of her
employment. Yet the Court unanimously held that
her statements were protected. Id. at 413.
In deciding Garcetti, the Court explicitly relied on
Givhan, distinguishing that case based on the facts-specifically, that Mr. Ceballos, unlike Ms. Givhan,
had a contractual duty to make the speech for which

9
he was punished. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
When Mr. Ceballos spoke "pursuant to [his] official
duties," id., he spoke because his employment
contract required him to speak. Thus, where the
employee spoke, and to whom he spoke, has no bearing on the question whether he spoke "pursuant to
¯.. official duties."
Second, and more importantly to the instant appeal,
the Court reaffirmed that whether a public employee’s speech is related to the employee’s job is also not
a dispositive or controlling consideration in determining whether the speech is protected. Id. Quoting
Pickering, the Court specifically noted the concern
that would be presented if public employees were
prevented from speaking about matters of which they
have knowledge due to their employment:
"Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite
opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation
of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is
essential that they be able to speak out freely on
such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal." The same is true of many other categories
of public employees.
Id. (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572).
Thus, contrary to the holding of the Eleventh
Circuit below, an employee does not speak "pursuant
to his official duties" merely because he speaks about
his job, matters he learned of at work, or topics that
are pertinent to his job. In fact, public employees’
unique knowledge of public policy matters relating to
their employment is one of the principal justifications
for protecting their speech. See infra Part III.
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In the Court’s words, "[t]he controlling factor
in Ceballos’ case is that his expressions were made
pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy," and
"Ceballos drafted his disposition memo because that
is part of what he, as a calendar deputy, was
employed to do." Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. The
Court cited this factor--that Ceballos drafted the
memorandum as a requirement of his job--as the
factor "distinguish[ing] Ceballos’ case from those in
which the First Amendment provides protection
against discipline." Id. Thus, a simple and straightforward reading of Garcetti reveals that it creates a
categorical exemption from First Amendment protection that applies only to speech required by a public
employee’s job duties.11
The Garcetti opinion justified the exemption of jobrequired speech from the First Amendment in several
ways. One of these justifications--that the speech
"owes its existence" to the employee’s job responsibilities, id.--has been read completely out of context in
the Eleventh Circuit, causing that court greatly to
expand the scope of the Garcetti exemption, in direct
conflict with the careful reasoning of the Court in
drawing boundaries around its holding, as outlined
above. The "owes its existence" dictum appears just
after the Court articulates the holding establishing
the categorical exemption. In full context, the Court
states that "[t]he significant point is that the memo
was written pursuant to Ceballos’ official duties.
11 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 ("Refusing to recognize First
Amendment claims based on government employees’ work
product does not prevent them from participating in public
debate. The employees retain the prospect of constitutional
protection for their contributions to the civic discourse. This
prospect of protection, however, does not invest them with a
right to perform their jobs however they see fit.").

11
Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public
employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed
as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of
employer control over what the employer itself has
commissioned or created." Id. at 421-22.
Read in context, this "owes its existence" language
is simply another way of stating that "speaking" by
drafting a legal memorandum was what Ceballos
was hired to do. Despite this obvious meaning, the
court below read the language out of context as creating an additional "but for the employee’s employment" test that swallows the Garcetti "pursuant to
... official duties" test whole. The Eleventh Circuit
thus erroneously stated: "Even if an employee was
not required to make the speech as part of his official
duties, he enjoys no First Amendment protection if
the speech ’owes its existence to [the] employee’s
professional responsibilities.’" Pet. App. 5a (quoting
Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1283, 1286
(1 lth Cir. 2009)) (alteration in original)
But the Garcetti Court took great pains to distinguish Mr. Ceballos from Mr. Pickering, who spoke
about what he observed and learned at his workplace
and identified himself as a teacher in doing so, and
Ms. Givhan, who spoke to her own supervisors about
what she observed at her workplace and did so while
at work. Neither of these employees could have prevailed if any speech they would not have made but
for their employment were excluded from the First
Amendment’s protections. The sole fact distinguishing Mr. Ceballos from these other two defendants
was that neither Mr. Pickering nor Ms. Givhan was
required by their employment contracts to engage in
the speech for which they were punished. Petitioner
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was not required by his job duties to testify in court,
so his speech is as protected as Ms. Givhan’s and Mr.
Pickering’s.
The Eleventh Circuit held that Petitioner’s speech
was unprotected because he did not speak "primarily
in [his] role as a citizen" and because his "testimony
touched only on acts he performed as part of his
official duties," and therefore "owe[d] its existence" to
his employment. Pet. App. 5a, 7a-8a (internal quotations omitted; first alteration in original). Amici
more fully address in the next section the notion of
speaking "in one’s role as a citizen," but, as the foregoing discussion illustrates, the Eleventh Circuit’s
ruling conflicts directly with the Court’s decision
in Garcetti, expanding the Garcetti exemption to
encompass the very speech that the Court specifically
and carefully excluded from it. Amici therefore urge
this Court, at a minimum, to correct the Eleventh
Circuit’s erroneous interpretation of Garcetti’s clear
and narrow exemption of work-required speech as a
general exemption of all work-related speech from
the First Amendment’s protections.
II. THE TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS AT A GRAND JURY PROCEEDING,
OR A CRIMINAL OR CIVIL TRIAL, IS
CITIZEN SPEECH WITHIN THE MEANING
OF GARCETTI
As argued above, Lane’s testimony pursuant to
subpoena at the federal criminal trial was citizen
speech within the meaning of Garcetti. But this case
presents an opportunity to provide clarity in this
area in a manner consistent with the rationale of
Garcetti. Amici propose the following rule: the truthful testimony of a witness at a grand jury proceeding,
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or a criminal or civil trial, whether or not pursuant to
subpoena, is citizen speech under Garcetti.12
At the outset, the truthful testimony of witnesses
in criminal trials, grand jury proceedings, and civil
trials is citizen speech because citizens traditionally
have a civic obligation to assist in criminal and civil
litigation. This Court has articulated this civic
obligation on many occasions. In Piemonte v. United
States, 367 U.S. 556 (1961), this Court observed:
"Every citizen.., owes to his society the duty of giving testimony to aid in the enforcement of the law."
Id. at 559 n.2. To the same effect is United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), where this Court
stated: "The duty to testify has long been recognized
as a basic obligation that every citizen owes his Government." Id. at 345. Much earlier, this Court also
declared: "It is ... beyond controversy that one of
the duties which the citizen owes to his government
is to support the administration of justice by attending its courts and giving his testimony whenever he
is properly summoned." Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421,438 (1932).
Indeed, this obligation is so important to the
administration of justice that this Court refused to
recognize a privilege allowing newsmen to refuse to
testify at grand jury proceedings and thereby avoid
their obligation as citizens to "respond to relevant
questions put to them in the course of a valid grand
jury investigation or criminal trial." Branzburg, 408
12 Amici express no opinion on whether there may be circumstances where public employee testimony that is allegedly false
should, like truthful testimony, be protected from employer
discipline by the First Amendment unless it is knowingly or
recklessly false. See generally New York Times Co. vo Sullivan,
supra.
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U.S. at 690-91. Even more dramatically, this Court
held in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),
that the President’s claim of executive privilege
for confidential communications did not excuse him
from his obligation to comply with a subpoena duces
tecum.
In Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d
Cir. 2008), the Third Circuit observed: "The notion
that all citizens owe an independent duty to society
to testify in court proceedings is thus well-grounded
in Supreme Court precedent." Id. at 229. It was for
this reason that the Third Circuit ruled that the
truthful testimony of a witness for the prosecution
in a state criminal trial was citizen speech under
Garcetti, even though the trial testimony arose out of
the witness’s official responsibilities as an employee.
"That an employee’s official responsibilities provided
the initial impetus to appear in court is immaterial
to his/her independent obligation as a citizen to testify
truthfully." Id. at 231.
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion
in Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2007),
where a police officer gave deposition testimony in
another police officer’s First Amendment retaliation
case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Using what
it called Garcetti’s practical approach, the Seventh
Circuit found it irrelevant for citizen speech purposes
that his deposition testimony was about his official
duties. "Being deposed in a civil suit pursuant to
a subpoena was unquestionably not one of Morales’
job duties because it was not part of what he was
employed to do." Id. at 598. The Seventh Circuit
had previously stated: "Assistance to prisoners and
their lawyers in litigation is not part of a [prison]
guard’s official duties." Fairley v. Fermaint, 482 F.3d
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897, 902 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J.). Thus,
the testimony that prison guards gave in inmates’
suits was protected from employer discipline under
Garcetti.
The historical understanding therefore supports
the conclusion that the testimony of an employee
who testifies truthfully in a criminal trial, grand jury
proceeding, or civil trial is citizen speech.13
Characterizing such speech as citizen speech
also promotes self-government, a central purpose of
the First Amendment. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948). As this Court declared in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 376
U.S. at 270. See also Harry Kalven, Jr., The New
York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191.
Criminal and civil trials directly advance this
purpose because they involve the application and
enforcement of legal principles established by democratically elected legislature to disputed facts. Such
trials also involve the administration of justice in
terms of promoting fairness and assuring that justice
is done. In addition, criminal and civil trials are
important components of self-government because
citizens themselves directly participate. Society thus
has a vital interest in hearing such speech.
Criminal trials and grand jury proceedings
expressly implicate self-government because charges
13 Even truthful testimony in a torts or contracts case is
citizen speech, we believe. Every citizen is potentially a plaintiff
or a defendant in private civil litigation and has an obligation to
promote fairness and justice by participating as a witness when
called on to do so.
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are brought and litigated by government prosecutors
on behalf of the political community. Because of the
importance of these proceedings in assuring fairness,
discouraging perjury and bias, and providing community therapeutic value, this Court has held that
the public has a First Amendment right to attend
criminal trials. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). But civil trials often
implicate self-government directly as well. This
Court’s decision in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963), stated that, for the NAACP, litigation was
a form of political expression related to combating
racial discrimination. Id. at 429-30. This Court
made the same observation regarding the ACLU in
connection with its civil liberties litigation. See In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 428 (1978).
Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 similarly implicate
self-government. In such cases, the plaintiff claims
that these defendants have violated his or her constitutional rights and seeks to hold them accountable.
Indeed, several of the circuit court decisions ruling
that truthful testimony is citizen speech within the
meaning of Garcetti involve prior testimony in § 1983
litigation. See Fairley v. Fermaint, supra; Morales
v. Jones, supra; Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace,
678 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2012). Moreover, this Court
recently held that the Petition Clause protects the
right of a public employee to sue his or her employer
under § 1983 for retaliation in violation of the First
Amendment where the subject of the lawsuit is a
matter of public concern. See Borough of Duryea v.
Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011).14
14 The Tenth Circuit has gone even further, stating: "We
write today to reaffirm that the constitutionally enumerated
right of a private citizen to petition the government for the
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In short, truthful testimony in criminal trials,
grand jury proceedings, and civil trials directly
promotes the self-government rationale of the First
Amendment. Such testimony occurs in governmental
proceedings and, whether the testimony is voluntary
or subpoenaed, provides information that is useful to
the political community. 15
Amici further maintain that treating truthful witness testimony in criminal trials, grand jury proceedings, and civil trials as citizen speech encourages
truthfulness and prevents the distortion of the truthseeking function of the judicial process.
Protecting the integrity of the judicial process
is the reason this Court has ruled that witnesses
accused of perjury at criminal trials are absolutely
immune from damages liability under § 1983. See
generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION
1983 §§ 7:40-7:41 (4th ed. 2013). In Briscoe v.
LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), the plaintiffs sued police
officers and a private party for allegedly testifying
falsely at their respective criminal trials and thereby
violating plaintiffs’ rights to due process and to trial
by an impartial jury. This Court held that all the
defendants were protected by absolute witness
immunity. It reasoned that, when § 1983 was enacted
redress of grievances does not pick and choose its causes but
extends to matters great and small, public and private." Van
Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 (10th Cir. 2007).
15 Truthful testimony in criminal and civil trials also furthers
the marketplace of ideas and truth-seeking rationale of the
First Amendment by providing information of high value in
judicial proceedings. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by Brandeis, J.)
("the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market").
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in 1871, the common-law background of absolute
lay witness immunity was well-established. The
underlying policy--the prevention of witness selfcensorship so as to protect the judicial process-applied to witnesses who were targets of § 1983
litigation as well. Because witnesses, whether lay
witnesses or police officers, play an important part in
the judicial process, they, like judges, should be protected by absolute immunity. The Court concluded
by applying a functional approach and emphasized
the function of being a witness rather than the status
of the witnesses as police officers.
This Court recently extended absolute witness immunity and the functional approach to all witnesses
testifying before grand juries. In Rehberg v. Paulk,
132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012), the plaintiff sued the chief
investigator in a district attorney’s office under
§ 1983, accusing him of testifying falsely before three
separate grand juries, each of which had separately
indicted the plaintiff on various charges that were
subsequently dismissed. This Court unanimously
held that the defendant was protected by absolute
witness immunity. The Court reasoned that the
factors supporting absolute immunity at trials also
applied to grand jury proceedings. In both situations, the concern was with depriving the tribunal of
evidence because of fear of retaliatory litigation. In
addition, absolute immunity made sense here because
grand jury secrecy otherwise could be subverted.
Amici submit that the reasons for absolute witness
immunity apply with equal if not greater force to
truthful witness testimony at criminal trials, grand
jury proceedings, and civil trials as citizen speech.
The concern in witness immunity cases is the integrity of the judicial process, just as it is here. Potential

19
witnesses, whether public employees or not, should
not be intimidated by the prospect of being sued in a
separate lawsuit or, if they are public employees, by
the prospect that they may lose their employment or
otherwise be the subject of an adverse employment
action. To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter in Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951), which
applied absolute immunity to legislative acts such as
holding hearings, we must not expect "uncommon
courage" from citizens any more than we do from
state legislators.
Amici’s proposed rule is actually far more modest
than the absolute witness immunity this Court has
already recognized. Absolute immunity protects the
witness from the need to defend even against the
charge that he or she testified falsely.16 In contrast,
all that Amici’s proposed rule does is place truthful
witness testimony at criminal trials, grand jury
proceedings, and civil trials in the category of citizen
speech. Subsequent First Amendment hurdles
remain for such a plaintiff, including the publicconcern inquiry, Pickering balancing, and causationin-fact under Mt. Healthy City School District Board
of Education v. Doyle, supra.
Finally, Amici’s proposed rule for citizen speech
promotes the purposes of Garcetti by providing a
clear standard to public employers and public
employees. It will also minimize ad hoc judicial
decision-making and reduce judicial intervention in
employment disputes.
16 Thus, if Lane had been sued for damages under § 1983 by
the state representative against whom he testified in the federal
trials for allegedly testifying falsely, he would be protected by
absolute witness immunity and would not even have to defend
against this claim.
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Under Amici’s proposed rule, public employers will
know that the truthful testimony of their employees
in criminal trials, grand jury proceedings, and civil
trials is citizen speech under Garcetti. Such a rule
avoids the uncertainty that this Court viewed as an
impediment to public employers’ managerial discretion. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422-23. Similarly, it
will provide guidance to public employees whose
truthful testimony might otherwise be chilled by
the threat of adverse employment consequences.
In addition, federal and state courts will have a
standard for implementing Garcetti in cases where
such truthful testimony is the motivation for the
alleged First Amendment violation.
In short, Amici’s proposed rule provides a clear
standard consistent with Garcetti, the purposes of
the First Amendment, this Court’s approach to
§ 1983 witness immunity, and the integrity of the
judicial process.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE TESTIMONY PROMOTES GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY, WHILE
PROTECTING THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
FROM IMPAIRMENT
Robust First Amendment protection for sworn,
truthful testimony also encourages public employees
to testify, and to do so candidly. The rule that Amici
propose in this brief--that truthful testimony of a
witness at a criminal trial, grand jury proceeding, or
civil trial is citizen speech under Garcetti--in turn
promotes the public interest both in governmental
transparency and in an unimpaired judicial system.
Public employees are at the "vanguard of the
citizenry," as a class of persons best able to bring to
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society’s attention issues of government wrongdoing.
See Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the
Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Public Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 907,
911 (2011). Any rule that inhibits their testimony
impairs that function, and thus risks permitting
corruption to continue unchecked. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit’s rule--relying on an expansive notion
of what it means for speech to "owe its existence" to
the employee’s professional responsibilities---conflicts
directly with this "vanguard of the citizenry" principle: such a reading covers any speech that would not
have happened but for the fact of public employment
and necessarily closes the door to all whistleblower
claims.
This expansive interpretation of Garcetti does
nothing less than redefine this whole conception of
what role public employees should play in ensuring
the fair and efficient administration of government
services. See Helen Norton, Constraining Public
Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE
L.J. 1, 4 (2009). Conscientious public servants who
wish to speak out and testify truthfully in the best
interests of society would be unable to do so without
jeopardizing their careers. Instead, they would face
the dilemma of choosing between honesty under oath
and protecting their livelihoods. Some employees
might choose not to testify and remain silent, or
might claim to have forgotten key details.
Those results would harm not only employees’
individual interests, but also society’s interest in
public accountability. Because public employees
have unique insights about topics that relate to their
employment, they are crucial voices in public debate
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--especially in cases, like this one, involving public
corruption. See id. (arguing that not permitting public employee speech that sheds light on government
wrongdoing "frustrates a meaningful commitment to
republican government because it allows government
officials to punish, and thus deter, whistleblowing
and other on-the-job speech that would otherwise
inform voters’ views and facilitate their ability to
hold the government politically accountable for its
choices").
Additionally, the unique role that public employees
play in a representative democracy is dictated by the
sheer size of American government. It is literally
impossible for "ordinary citizens to keep track of all
the myriad departments that make up federal, state,
and local government" to ensure that they are functioning as they should. Secunda, 48 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. at 949. This case is a prime example: ordinary
citizens would have little ability to determine that
Representative Schmitz was earning a substantial
paycheck without reporting for work at the CITY
program; only a government employee could have
discovered her corruption.17
The Court embraced the idea of public employees
at the vanguard of the citizenry in Pickering. In
particular, in allowing the school teacher in Pickering to speak out on legitimate matters of public
concern through an editorial to the local newspaper,
17 See Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 273 (4th Cir. 2009)
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) ("[A]s the state grows more layered
and impacts lives more profoundly, it seems inimical to First
Amendment principles to treat too summarily those who bring,
often at some personal risk, its operations into public view. It
is vital to the health of our polity that the functioning of the
ever more complex and powerful machinery of government not
become democracy’s dark lagoon.").
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the Court observed that "[t]eachers are, as a class,
the members of a community most likely to have
informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent.
Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak
out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal." 391 U.S. at 572. More recently in
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per
curiam), the Court reaffirmed "the right of employees
to speak on matters of public concern, typically
matters concerning government policies that are of
interest to the public at large, a subject on which
public employees are uniquely qualified to comment."
Id. at 80 (emphasis added); see also Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion)
("Government employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they
work").
Consistent with good government, then, it is
crucial that public employees act as the eyes and
ears of the citizenry when it comes to governmental
operations. Government employees are "uniquely
qualified to comment" on such matters of public
concern and raise alarms when something is amiss
not only because of their physical proximity to the
problem, but also because of their special expertise in
dealing with the governmental issues that come to
their attention. In the testimonial context, they also
provide courts with information needed to protect us
all from public corruption and other types of government wrongdoing.
That principle applies fully here. Mr. Lane
protected his community from public corruption by
giving to the court the necessary information it
needed to convict Ms. Schmitz for her misconduct.
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It does not stretch the imagination to see that the
consequence of the Eleventh Circuit’s cramped holding is to chill other conscientious public employees
from undertaking necessary, and perhaps unpopular,
actions in the face of allegations of misconduct.
Without the ability of public servants to bring to
light government’s baser practices, all citizens suffer
from the resulting lack of government transparency
and accountability. Overturning the Eleventh Circuit’s holding is essential to call public employees
back to the vanguard to protect us all from government fraud, waste, and abuse.
Not only does deterring employees from testifying
prevent them from exposing corruption, but it actually encourages corruption in the first instance. This
is because the people who engage in corruption are
often supervisors or others who are in positions of
power. If these supervisors know that their employees will be scared to report them, even under subpoena, then it creates an incentive for them not only
to threaten their employees with retaliation, but also
to engage in additional corrupt acts. Of course, many
public supervisors are dedicated public servants who
would never do anything corrupt no matter what
the law says about testimony. But for those who are
inclined to cheat, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding
provides some solace.
In addition to the importance of providing protection to public employees at the vanguard of the
citizenry, it is also crucial that public employees be
able to speak freely and truthfully about government
malfeasance so that the judicial process is not distorted. Distortion of the litigation process occurs
when public employees do not feel free to testify in
various legal proceedings for fear of losing their
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jobs.is This Court expressed analogous concerns in
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001),
where the Court struck down as violative of the First
Amendment a federally imposed restriction prohibiting Legal Services Corporation ("LSC")-funded attorneys, as a condition of the receipt of federal funds,
from challenging the legality or constitutionality of
existing welfare laws.
According to this Court, the restriction addressed
not the government’s own speech (the viewpoint of
which the government is free to control), but instead
impermissibly regulated private speech on the basis
of viewpoint. This was because the purpose of the
LSC program was to facilitate private speech, rather
than promote a governmental message. The Court
determined that the federal restriction on LSC attorneys’ legal arguments was tantamount to controlling
the judicial system in a way that distorted it "by
altering the traditional role of the attorneys ... [to]
present all the reasonable and well-grounded arguments necessary for proper resolution of the case."
Id. at 544-45. This Court thus concluded that, "[b]y
seeking to prohibit the analysis of certain legal
issues and to truncate presentation to the courts,
the enactment under review prohibits speech and
expression upon which courts must depend for the
proper exercise of the judicial power." Id. at 545.
No less than in Velazquez, "[t]he restriction imposed by the [lack of protection for public employee
testimonial speech] threatens severe impairment of
the judicial function." Id. at 546. Where public
employees testify truthfully as citizens at criminal
18 The arguments made here concerning distortion of the litigation process are parallel and consistent with those contained
in the discussion on witness immunity supra at Part II.
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trials, grand jury proceedings, and civil trials, there
is a serious risk of distortion of the legal process if
they are fearful of the employment consequences of
their testimony (which is clearly not government
speech that "owes its existence" to the government
employer). Such consequences tend to encourage
lying or at least the shading of the truth. It is essential that the law instead provide these employees
with a modicum of First Amendment free speech
protection so that they may engage in "speech and
expression upon which courts [may] depend for the
proper exercise of the judicial power."
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of
the Eleventh Circuit should be reversed.
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